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Abstract
Part I discusses the treatment of domestic violence as a human rights issue under international
law, focusing on the shift in the conceptualization of violence against women from a private matter
to a human rights issue. By framing gender-based violence as a means to perpetuate the social,
economic, and political inequality of women, the international community has imposed positive
obligations upon the state to not only punish but to prevent gender-based violence and to eliminate
its root causes. In Parts II and III, I contrast the approaches of the highest courts of the United
States and South Africa. Part II analyzes the conceptualization of domestic violence as a private
crime by the U.S. Supreme Court and its refusal to constitutionalize a right to be free of gender-
based violence. By framing gender-based violence within the framework of formal equality, the
Supreme Court erases the relationship between intimate violence and women’s full and equal en-
joyment of their fundamental constitutional rights and benefits. The refusal of the Supreme Court
to conceptualize intimate violence as an issue of equality threatens the potential of criminal justice
reforms to obligate the state to eradicate gender-based violence. The criminalization of intimate
violence sends a strong normative message that such conduct violates important social norms and
will not be tolerated by the state. Focusing on criminal justice reforms that punish perpetrators,
however, can reinforce the traditional notion that intimate violence is the result of individual de-
viance rather than the systematic subordination of women in society. Part III analyzes the approach
of the South African Constitutional Court, which has explicitly conceptualized intimate violence
as a means of gender subordination that denies women equality, self-determination, and access to
fundamental rights and liberties. The Court has held that the South African Constitution imposes
affirmative obligations on the state to prevent and rectify intimate violence. In construing violence
against women as a violation of the right to equality, the Court repeatedly has emphasized that the
Constitution guarantees substantive rather than formal equality. The Court also has recognized the
inter-relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, holding that rights to equality, lib-
erty, and dignity are meaningless in the absence of the fulfillment of basic socioeconomic rights.
The Court’s jurisprudence, therefore, has tremendous potential to transform both the legal and the
socioeconomic subordination of women that reflect and perpetuate violence against women.
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INTRODUCTION
Intimate violence against women is a global pandemic. The
World Health Organization ("WHO") in 2006 concluded that
domestic violence against women is universal and pervasive.1 In
fifteen nations studied by WHO, fifteen percent to seventy-one
percent of women in intimate relationships reported having
been physically assaulted by an intimate male partner. 2 The con-
sequences are devastating to women and society. Violence
against women damages women and girls-physically, emotion-
ally, sexually, and economically-and violates their human
rights, denying them equality, security, dignity, and fundamental
liberties.
Both international and national law historically have con-
ceptualized domestic violence as a private matter between indi-
viduals within the family, outside the scope of state regulation.
3
Over the past decade, however, the international community has
recognized that violence against women reflects and reinforces
women's subordination, denying them the right to equality and
enjoyment of fundamental freedoms, including life, liberty, and
security of the person.4 The Declaration for the Elimination of
* Professor of Law and Deputy Director Clinical Law Program, West Virginia Uni-
versity College of Law. The author would like to thank the following persons for their
comments and suggestions: Andrea McArdle, Joyce McConnell, Marjorie McDiarmid,
Penelope Andrews, Saras Jagwanth, and Susan Bazilli.
1. See WORLD HEALTH ORG. ("WHO"), THE WHO MULTI-COUNTRY STUDY ON WO-
MEN'S HEALTH AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN vii (2005), available at http://
www.who.int/gender/violence/who multicountry-study/summary-report/en/
("[V]iolence against women by their male partners is common, wide-spread and far
reaching in its impact.").
2. See id. at 5 ("The proportion of ever-partnered women who had ever exper-
ienced physical or sexual violence, or both, by an intimate partner in their lifetime,
ranged from 15% to 71%, with most sites falling between 29% and 62%.").
3. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Commission on Human Rights, Inte-
gration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence against Women,
6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.4 (Mar. 10, 1999) (prepared by Radhika Coomara-
swamy) [hereinafter Integration of the Human Rights of Women].
4. See Radhika Coomaraswamy, Combatting Domestic Violence: Obligations of the State,
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Violence Against Women, adopted by the United Nations
("U.N.") General Assembly in 1994, condemns violence against
women and encourages states to take steps to prevent and elimi-
nate it.5 The Convention for the Elimination of Violence
Against Women ("CEDAW") similarly has been interpreted to
prohibit gender-based violence, which is defined as discrimina-
tion against women.6 Both documents reject the notion that do-
mestic violence is a private matter and instead impose positive
duties upon the state to protect and prevent violence between
private individuals.
Despite the recognition by the international community
that intimate violence denies women their right to equality and
civil liberties, the United States Supreme Court has continued to
conceptualize domestic violence as a private matter that does not
implicate the right to equal treatment or due process under the
federal constitution. The Supreme Court has resisted efforts to
constitutionalize a right to be protected from domestic or gen-
der-motivated violence. In recent decisions, the Court has held
that the U.S. Constitution does not impose affirmative obliga-
tions on the federal government to prevent violence between
private persons, 7 that Congress lacks the power to create a fed-
eral civil rights remedy intended to redress gender-motivated vi-
olence,' and that there is no constitutionally protected property
interest in the enforcement of a mandatory arrest statute under
the Due Process Clause.9 Rather than conceptualize domestic
INNOCENTI DiG., June 2000, at 10, 10-11, available at http://www.unicef-icdc.org/
publications/pdf/digest6e.pdf. Coomarawaswamy argues that with respect to the
human rights violation of domestic violence, states have a duty under international law
to take "preventive and punitive steps" in response to such rights violations, including
criminalization, legislation, police action and community services. See id. at 2.
5. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993)
[hereinafter Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women].
6. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
7. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197
(1989) (holding that there is no Due Process Clause violation when the state fails to
protect an individual from injury by a private actor).
8. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (holding that the Com-
merce Clause does not grant Congress the power to create a federal remedy for domes-
tic violence).
9. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (holding that an
individual does not have "a property interest in police enforcement of the restraining
order against her husband").
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violence as an issue of gender equality that concretely affects wo-
men's enjoyment of fundamental liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has defined domestic violence
as a private crime of violence that occurs within the domestic
sphere, outside the purview of the federal courts.
The U.S. approach contrasts markedly with that of the
South African Constitutional Court, which explicitly has recog-
nized that domestic and gender violence reinforce the subordi-
nation of women. Rather than view violence against women as a
private matter, the Constitutional Court has employed a contex-
tualized approach that focuses on the effects of widespread gen-
der-based violence on women's right to gender equality, bodily
integrity and security of the person, and full enjoyment of their
civil liberties. Rejecting the public/private dichotomy, the Con-
stitutional Court has held that the South African Constitution
imposes affirmative obligations on the State to protect women
from private violence. The Constitutional Court repeatedly has
upheld national domestic violence legislation, recognizing that it
is a means to fulfill the State's constitutional obligation to afford
women gender equality and other fundamental rights. 10
The difference in approach does not reflect merely a differ-
ence in the content of the constitutions, but also in the courts'
conceptualization of the nature and effect of intimate violence
upon women. The U.S. Supreme Court has conceptualized do-
mestic violence as a violent crime between individuals that is sub-
ject to individual state regulation rather than an issue of gender
subordination or equality that implicates women's constitutional
rights and civil liberties. In contrast, the South African Constitu-
tional Court has repeatedly recognized that intimate violence,
and violence against women, subordinates women and denies
them access to equality, dignity, and other fundamental constitu-
tional rights.
The conceptualization of intimate violence against women
has critical implications for the role of the state in the preven-
tion and eradication of intimate violence. In this Article, I ex-
amine the treatment of domestic violence as a human rights is-
10. See, e.g., Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Sec. & Another 2001 (10) BCLR 995
(CC) 62 (S. Afr.) (noting that an affirmative obligation to protect women from do-
mestic violence for the police exists under the interim constitution, statutory law, and
international law).
2008]
490 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 31:487
sue under international law. I then compare the dramatically
different theoretical approaches of the United States Supreme
Court and the South African Constitutional Court to conceptual-
izing intimate violence and gender equality under their respec-
tive constitutions. By employing a comparative law approach,
this Article helps illuminate the different judicial conceptions of
violence against women, the nature of the right to equality, and
the role of the state in promoting or redressing the gendered
impact of intimate violence.
Part I discusses the treatment of domestic violence as a
human rights issue under international law, focusing on the shift
in the conceptualization of violence against women from a pri-
vate matter to a human rights issue. By framing gender-based
violence as a means to perpetuate the social, economic, and po-
litical inequality of women, the international community has im-
posed positive obligations upon the state to not only punish but
to prevent gender-based violence and to eliminate its root
causes.
In Parts II and III, I contrast the approaches of the highest
courts of the United States and South Africa. Part II analyzes the
conceptualization of domestic violence as a private crime by the
U.S. Supreme Court and its refusal to constitutionalize a right to
be free of gender-based violence. By framing gender-based vio-
lence within the framework of formal equality, the Supreme
Court erases the relationship between intimate violence and wo-
men's full and equal enjoyment of their fundamental constitu-
tional rights and benefits. The refusal of the Supreme Court to
conceptualize intimate violence as an issue of equality threatens
the potential of criminal justice reforms to obligate the state to
eradicate gender-based violence. The criminalization of inti-
mate violence sends a strong normative message that such con-
duct violates important social norms and will not be tolerated by
the state. Focusing on criminal justice reforms that punish per-
petrators, however, can reinforce the traditional notion that inti-
mate violence is the result of individual deviance rather than the
systematic subordination of women in society.
Part III analyzes the approach of the South African Consti-
tutional Court, which has explicitly conceptualized intimate vio-
lance as a means of gender subordination that denies women
equality, self-determination, and access to fundamental rights
and liberties. The Court has held that the South African Consti-
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tution imposes affirmative obligations on the state to prevent
and rectify intimate violence. In construing violence against wo-
men as a violation of the right to equality, the Court repeatedly
has emphasized that the Constitution guarantees substantive
rather than formal equality. The Court also has recognized the
inter-relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution,
holding that rights to equality, liberty, and dignity are meaning-
less in the absence of the fulfilllment of basic socioeconomic
rights. The Court's jurisprudence, therefore, has tremendous
potential to transform both the legal and the socioeconomic
subordination of women that reflect and perpetuate violence
against women.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING INTIMATE VIOLENCE
The international community has come to recognize that
violence against women is not merely a private family matter but
a fundamental human rights issue that requires affirmative state
action."1 Historically, state governments have engaged in a wide-
spread pattern of non-enforcement of criminal sanctions against
perpetrators of domestic violence. 2 Because domestic violence
occurs within private familial or intimate relationships, states
have rationalized non-intervention by invoking the public/pri-
vate dichotomy in which domestic violence is categorized as a
private matter rather than a public harm.' 3
Discrimination on the basis of sex is prohibited under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and numerous interna-
11. See generally Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, supra
note 5.
12. See Integration of the Human Rights of Women, supra note 3, 1 242 ("Overwhelm-
ingly, States are failing in their international obligations to prevent, investigate and
prosecute violence against women in the family.").
13. See id. ("With few exceptions, domestic violence continues, to varying degrees,
to be treated by Governments as a private family matter."); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rts., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Integration of the Human Rights of Women
and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women, 14, EICN.412006161 (Jan 20, 2006)
(prepared byYakin Erturk), [hereinafter Report of Special Rapporteur] (identifying the
public/private dichotomy in international human rights law as "one of the main obsta-
cles to the protection of women's rights" and "an ideological barrier to the develop-
ment of the human rights discourse in many societies.... ."); Julie Mertus, State Discrimi-
natory Family Law and Customary Abuses, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHjTS, 135 (Julie
Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) (arguing that the public/private separate sphere
ideology rationalizes the refusal of governments to deal with family violence).
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tional covenants, including the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, and the American Convention on
Human Rights. 4 None of these documents, however, explicitly
prohibits gender-based violence against women or defines it as a
violation of women's fundamental right to equality or civil liber-
ties. As Hilary Charlesworth has argued, these international in-
struments have defined equality as formal equality, requiring
non-discrimination against women in certain contexts.
15
Over the past twenty years, women's groups have engaged in
an intense campaign to focus the international community's at-
tention on the pervasiveness of violence against women and its
devastating impact on women's position in society.' 6 Feminist
scholars have sought to conceptualize gender-based violence as a
means of gender subordination that not only impairs women's
right to equality but perpetuates women's disempowerment and
socioeconomic inequality.
In 1994, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
appointed a Special Rapporteur on violence against women. In
a subsequent report, the Special Rapporteur concluded that vio-
lence against women and girls "is one of most pervasive of
human rights violations, denying women and girls equality, se-
curity, dignity, self-worth, and their right to enjoy fundamental
freedoms."' 7 Rejecting the public/private dichotomy used to ra-
tionalize the non-interference of states in domestic violence, the
Special Rapporteur explained that states actively construct the
14. Rebecca J. Cook, Women's International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15,
at 59, 63-64.
15. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, What Are Women's International Human Rights?, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 59, 63-64 (Re-
becca Cook, ed., 1994).
16. Elisabeth Friedman chronicles the mobilization of global women's ights activ-
ists to insist that international law recognize women's rights as human rights. She de-
scribes the activism of the Center for Women's Global Leadership and the United
Naitons Development Fund for Women ("UNIFEM") in mobilizing for recognition of
women's rights and their "seizure" of the 1993 U.N. World Conference on Human
Rights. Their activism resulted in a day-long presentation of panels describing the fail-
ure of human rights law to protect and promote women's human rights. As a result of
their efforts, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action expressly incorporated
their concerns. See Elisabeth Friedman, Women's Human Rights: The Emegence of a Move-
ment, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS 18-35 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper, eds.,
1995).
17. Coomaraswamy, supra note 4 at 2.
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status, rights, and remedies of women within the family through
a host of laws that have reinforced women's subordination.'"
These include laws regulating sexuality, violence, privacy, di-
vorce, adultery, property, succession, employment, and child
custody. 9 Through regulation of the so-called private or domes-
tic sphere, states actively construct and maintain the subordinate
position of women in society.
The adoption by the Committee for the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women to define gender-based violence as
prohibited discrimation marked a fundamental shift in the un-
derstanding of the nature and impact of violence against wo-
men. The Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women ("CEDAW") outlaws discrimination against wo-
men and, while it does not specifically address domestic vio-
lence, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women has interpreted its mandate to prohibit violence
against women.20 General Recommendation No. 19 of CEDAW spe-
cifically addresses violence against women.2 1 It recognizes that
gender-based violence "is a form of discrimination that inhibits
women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on an equal basis
with men. '22 The Recommendation defines gender-based vio-
lence as "violence that is directed against a woman because she is
a woman or that affects women disproportionately."2 It broadly
defines gender-based violence to include "acts that inflict physi-
cal, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, co-
ercion and other deprivations of liberty."24
Rejecting the notion that domestic or gender-based vio-
lence is a purely private matter between individuals, General Rec-
ommendation No. 19 explicitly states that gender-based violence
constitutes within the meaning of Article 1 of CEDAW and "im-
18. See id. 1 7 ("Such laws validate and entrench the dominant ideology of the
traditional family and the woman's position within it.").
19. See id.
20. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Rec-
ommendation No. 19: Violence against Women, in Report of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/44/38 (1989) (recommending that States
should include information about sexual violence, domestic abuse, and sexual harass-
ment.).
21. See generally id.
22. See id. 1.
23. Id. 6.
24. Id.
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pairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and
fundamental freedoms under general international or under
human rights conventions," including the right to life, the right
to be free of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;
the right to equal protection; the right to liberty and security of
the person and the right to the highest attainable physical and
mental health.25 Gender-based violence, the Recommendation
states, has been justified by traditional attitudes and stereotypes
that women are subordinate to men.26 Focusing on the discrimi-
natory effect of gender-based violence, the Recommendation ex-
plains that such violence deprives women "of the equal enjoy-
ment, exercise, and knowledge of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms."27 The Recommendation spells out the concrete
effects of gender-based violence upon women's lives. Recogniz-
ing that "[f] amily violence is one of the most insidious forms of
violence against women," the Recommendation explains that
such violence impairs women's right to equality.28 Specifically,
family violence not only puts women's health at risk, but "im-
pair[s] their ability to participate in family life and public life on
a basis of equality."29
Having defined gender-based violence as an issue of equal-
ity, the Recommendation explicitly requires states to take posi-
tive measures to eliminate violence against women. Discrimina-
tion under CEDAW is not limited to state action; the Recommen-
dation states that "[u] nder general international law and specific
human rights covenants, States may also be responsible for pri-
vate acts [of violence] if they fail to act with due diligence to
prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of
violence, and for providing compensation. "30
To fulfill their obligations under CEDAW, the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women expressly
recommends that States Parties should take "appropriate and ef-
fective measures to overcome all forms of gender-based violence,
whether by public or private act."3' Specific recommendations
25. Id. 1 7(a),(b),(c),(d),(g).
26. Id. 11.
27. Id.
28. Id. 23.
29. Id.
30. Id. 1 9.
31. Id. 1 24(a).
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include ensuring that laws involving gender violence adequately
protect women; providing protective and support services for vic-
tims; and providing effective complaint procedures and reme-
dies for gender-based violence, including compensation.3 2 In
addition, states should take measures to overcome attitudes, cus-
toms, and traditions that perpetuate violence against women. 33
The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
1994, similarly rejects the traditional notion of intimate violence
as solely a matter that affects women in their family roles. This
declaration recognizes that violence against women "is a mani-
festation of historically unequal power relations between men
and women" and one means of subordination of women. 4
Rather than conceptualize violence against women as a criminal
act between private persons, the Declaration recognizes the con-
crete impact of gender-based violence upon women's fundamen-
tal rights and liberties, clearly framing violence against women as
an issue of gender equality. Further, the Declaration states that
violence against women "constitutes a violation of the rights and
fundamental freedoms of women and impairs or nullifies their
enjoyment of those rights and freedoms" and "is an obstacle to
the achievement of equality, development and peace."35
Because the Declaration recognizes the concrete effect of
violence against women on their status as citizens, it urges States
to take positive action to eliminate and prevent violence against
women. 36 Such action includes legal measures to protect women
against violence not only by the State, but by private persons.37
The Declaration provides that States should pursue a policy of
eliminating violence against women that includes "[e]xercis-
[ing] due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance
with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women,
whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private per-
sons."" Specifically, states should develop "preventive ap-
32. Id. 24(b), (f).
33. Id. 24(e).
34. See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, supra note 5, at
pmbl.
35. Id.
36. See id. art. 4 ("States should pursue by all appropriate means and without delay
a policy of eliminating violence against women.").
37. See id. art. 4(c).
38. Id.
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proaches and all those measures of a legal, political, administra-
tive and cultural nature that promote the protection of women
against any form of violence." 9
Another example of the changing conception of violence
against women as an issue of gender equality can be found in the
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women, adopted by the Organi-
zation of American States in 1994 ("Convention of Bel6m do
Pard").4° Rejecting the notion that violence against women is a
private matter between individuals, the Convention of Belkm do
Pardi conceptualizes violence against women within the context
of gender inequality. Its preamble states that violence against
women is "a manifestation of the historically unequal power rela-
tions between women and men. 41 Violence against women is
defined broadly to include "physical, sexual and psychological
violence."4 2 Article 3 specifically provides that women's rights
are "to be free from violence in both the public and private
spheres."43 Rejecting the public/private dichotomy that ratio-
nalizes state inaction, the Convention of Bel6m do Pardi requires
states to take affirmative steps to prevent and eradicate violence
against women. States must "pursue, by all appropriate means
and without delay, policies to prevent, punish and eradicate such
violence. 4 4 Specifically, it requires States "to apply due dili-
gence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for violence
against women."4 5 Seeking to eradicate the root causes of vio-
lence against women, the Convention of Bel6m do Pari specifies
that States must take all appropriate measures "to modify legal
or customary practices which sustain the persistence and toler-
ence of violence against women."46
By establishing state responsibility for the prevention and
elimination of domestic violence, the due diligence standard
embodied in these documents erodes the public/private dichot-
omy that historically insulated the state from responsibility for
39. Id. art. 4(f).
40. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication
of Violence Against Women, June 9, 1949, 27 U.S.T. 3301, 1438 U.N.T.S. 63.
41. Id. pmbl.
42. Id. art. 1.
43. Id. art. 3.
44. Id. art. 7.
45. Id. art. 7(b).
46. Id. art. 7(e).
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violence between intimate partners. Framing intimate violence
as an issue of gender equality focuses attention on the concrete
effects of violence upon women's lives, both inside the home
and outside in the public sphere.
Recent opinions by the Committee for the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women and the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights help establish a body of law that seeks
to hold States accountable for failure to address gender-based
violence. While those decisions addressed violation of the
States' duty to punish domestic violence and protect women,
they also found that the States' inaction perpetuated traditional
notions that women are subordinate to men. The Committee
for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women in 2006
issued a decision in A.T. v. Hungary47 finding that Hungary
failed to fulfill its obligations under CEDAW.4" Ms. A.T. had
been repeatedly and brutally beaten by her husband, who had
threatened to kill her.4" Hungary did not provide any procedure
for Ms. A.T. to obtain a protective or restraining order against
her husband, or offer her shelter to protect her from violence.5"
The Committee found that Hungary had not fulfilled its obliga-
tion to prevent violence against women and to protect women
from violence, as required under Article 2(a), (b), and (e) of
CEDAW.5" It concluded that Hungary's failure violated A.T.'s
human rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly her right
to security of person. It was particularly concerned that Hungary
had not adopted any legislation to combat domestic violence,
provide orders of protection, or provide shelters to protect wo-
men from violence.5 2
In addition, the Committee looked beyond Hungary's fail-
ure to institute appropriate legal reforms and social services to
protect women. It found that the facts demonstrated the persis-
tence of traditional gender stereotypes regarding the role and
responsibilities of women and men in the family. Accordingly,
47. Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
under Article 7, 3, of the Optional Protocal the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Communication No.: 212003, Ms. A.T. v.
Hungary.
48. Id. 2.1, 2.2, 2.3.
49. Id. 9.3, 9.4.
50. Id. 9.3.
51. Id. 9.4.
52. Id. 9.4; see also CEDAW, supra note 6, art. 5.
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the Committee held that Hungary violated Article 5 of CEDAW,
which requires states to "modify the social and cultural patterns
of conduct" to eliminate prejudices and practices which are
based on the presumed inferiority or the superiority of men or
women or upon stereotyped sex roles, 53 as well as Article 16,
which requires states to "to take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations .. .
In Maria Da Penha v. Brazil, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights in 2001 similarly ruled that Brazil had violated
its obligations under the Convention of Beldm do Pardi by failing
to prosecute and punish domestic violence perpetrated upon
the petitioner by her husband.5 5 As a result of her husband's
violence, the petitioner suffered irreversible paraplegia.5 6 The
Commission found that Brazil's fifteen year failure to prosecute
or punish the domestic violence committed against the peti-
tioner indicated that Brazil condoned the violence, which exac-
erbated the effects of the violence upon the petitioner.5 1 Signifi-
cantly, the Commission found that the condonation of this vio-
lence by the Brazilian legal system "perpetuate[s] the
psychological, social, and historical roots and factors that sustain
and encourage violence against women."5  The Commission
concluded that Brazil was liable for failure to protect the right of
the petitioner to life; physical, mental, and moral integrity; per-
sonal safety and dignity; equal protection; and judicial recourse
for protection against acts that violate her rights. 59
A. T. and Maria Da Penha illustrate the persistence of state
indifference to domestic violence that international law now
condemns. While both focused on the failure of the States to
address the effects of violence after it occurs, they also focused
on the role of the State in condoning violence against women
and perpetuating traditional ideologies that rationalize women's
subordination. Both provide doctrinal support to encourage
53. Id. 9.4; see also CEDAW, supra note 6, art. 5.
54. Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 54/01,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111 Doc. 20 rev. at 704 (2000).
55. Id. 1 2.
56. Id. 55.
57. Id.
58. Id. 58.
59. Id.
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States to move beyond the mere criminalization of violence
against women and to take positive action to modify traditional
and customary law, beliefs, and structures that condone and per-
petuate violence against women.
II. UNITED STATES: RESISTANCE TO
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE RIGHT TO
PROTECTION FROM INTIMATE VIOLENCE
In contrast to the international treaties and documents
identifying domestic violence as a means of gender subordina-
tion, the U.S. Supreme Court has not treated domestic violence
as an issue of gender discrimination or equality that justifies con-
stitutional protection. Its approach rests upon an artificial dis-
tinction between the public and private, in which domestic vio-
lence has been conceptualized as a private harm to individuals
that occurs within the privacy of the family rather than as an
issue of gender discrimination or subordination that impedes
women's enjoyment of equality, life, liberty, or property.
While the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly guarantee
the right to gender equality, the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee individuals the right to equal treatment
under the law as well as protection from the arbitrary depriva-
tion of life, liberty, and property by the State.6° The Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the federal govern-
ment and provides, inter alia, that no person shall "be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."6" The
Fourteenth Amendment provides, inter alia, that no State shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person ... equal protection of the
laws."62 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to guarantee the right to equal protection
on the basis of gender. However, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted these rights quite narrowly.
As a threshold matter, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Constitution to guarantee negative rather than positive
rights. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution guar-
antees individuals freedom from state action that interferes with
60. Id. amend. V, XIV.
61. Id. amend. V.
62. Id. amend. XIV.
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the exercise of their constitutional rights; it does not positively
obligate the State to take affirmative action to ensure access or
fulfillment of such rights.6 3 In Harris v. McRae, the Supreme
Court held that the Constitution did not require the govern-
ment to provide funding for low-income women to obtain abor-
tions.6 4 While the government may not interfere with the right
of women to obtain abortions, it is not required as a matter of
due process to fund the procedure, even if the result is that an
individual woman may be barred as a practical matter from exer-
cising her right. As the Court explained, "[a] though the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against
unwarranted government interference ... it does not confer an
entitlement to such [governmental aid] as may be necessary to
realize all the advantages of that freedom."65 Harris embraces
the view of the Constitution as embracing negative liberties
rather than positive rights.66
The Supreme Court also has interpreted the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to prohibit discrimination by state actors,
not private persons.67 Moreover, only discrimination that is in-
tentional is prohibited. Facially neutral policies with discrimina-
tory effects alone do not violate the right to equal protection;
proof of specific discriminatory intent is required.6" As a result,
the right to equal protection cannot be invoked to challenge
state action that disproportionately harms women, absent evi-
dence of a specific intent to discriminate against them.
In applying the guarantee of equal protection, the Supreme
Court has adopted a formalistic theory of equality that focuses
on eliminating differences in treatment between men and wo-
men. As feminist scholars have long recognized, the right to
gender equality has generally been considered to embrace for-
mal equality, not substantive equality. Formal equality rests on
63. See Robin West, The Constitution and the Obligations of Government to Secure the Mate-
rial-Preconditions for a Good Society: Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1901, 1906-07 (2001).
64. 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (no obligation to fund abortions or other medical
services).
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979).
67. Id. at 272.
68. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 2-5
(1994).
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the notion that likes "should be treated alike" and requires that
men and women be treated the same to the extent that they are
similarly situated.6" The issue for courts is whether the state has
treated men and women differently without sufficient justifica-
tion.7 ° In contrast, substantive equality considers the effects of
state action upon women, recognizing that women are often dif-
ferently situated from men for a number of reasons, including
past discrimination or disadvantage, and that such differences
may justify differential treatment. While the Court's gender ju-
risprudence can be read to reflect antisubordination concerns, it
continues to define discrimination as different or unequal treat-
ment by the state.
Constitutionalizing a right to protection from domestic vio-
lence under U.S. equality jurisprudence, therefore, is extremely
difficult. Because intimate violence occurs between private citi-
zens, the Supreme Court has had difficulty conceptualizing it as
a form of discrimination that is cognizable as a violation of equal
protection. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose an affirmative duty
upon the state to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citi-
zens against invasion from other citizens.7 The petitioners,
Joshua DeShaney and his mother, sued to recover damages sus-
tained by Joshua, who at four years of age suffered severe brain
damage at the hands of his father, whom a state social service
agency had investigated for suspected child abuse but had taken
no action.7 2 Petitioner sought to recover damages from the
state, alleging the state had deprived him of his liberty without
due process of law by its failure to protect him, in violation of his
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
73
The Supreme Court in DeShaney held that the state's failure
to provide the petitioner with adequate protection against his
father's violence did not violate the substantive component of
69. See generally id.
70. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195
(1989).
71. Id. at 193.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 203.
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the right to Due Process.7 4 The Court held that the Due Process
Clause forbids the state itself from depriving individuals of life,
liberty, and property without due process of law; it does not,
however, affirmatively require the state to protect its citizens
from harm by other citizens.75 Thus, the Due Process Clause op-
erates as a "limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guar-
antee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. "76
In Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the Supreme Court held that,
under DeShaney, the state has no affirmative duty as a matter of
substantive due process to protect women from private vio-
lence. 7  The Court's equality jurisprudence, therefore, contin-
ues to embrace the public/private dichotomy that has been re-
jected under CEDAW, the Declaration on the Elimination of Vio-
lence Against Women, and the Convention of Beldm do Pard.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is possible to chal-
lenge discriminatory state statutes or policies that permit the
non-enforcement of domestic violence statutes as violations of
the right to equal protection. If states deny female victims of
intimate violence the same protection or process afforded to
male victims, for example, such differential treatment will be
seen as a violation of the right to equal treatment. As a practical
matter, however, such statutes or policies are now usually
phrased in gender-neutral terms (referring, for example, to
"spousal violence") .7' Equal protection challenges to facially
neutral statutes are difficult to sustain. To prove unlawful gen-
der discrimination, it must be established that the state acted
because of an intent to discriminate on the basis of gender; evi-
dence that non-enforcement disparately affects women (since
women are disproportionately the victims of domestic violence)
is insufficient to establish a violation.79 Consequently, numerous
federal courts have held that facially neutral spousal assault poli-
74. See id. at 196.
75. Id. at 195.
76. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
77. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2189-90 (1996).
78. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
79. See Siegel, supra note 77, at 2191 (noting that a number of federal courts have
not subjected facially neutral spousal assault policies to heightened scrutiny); see also
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) (denying motion to
dismiss claim of wife against police for alleged discrimination in failing to enforce as-
sault law against husband.).
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cies do not discriminate on the basis of gender.80
To redress the lack of enforcement of domestic violence
statutes, federal and state legislators have enacted various re-
forms to remedy a systematic bias against prosecution of domes-
tic violence and to provide redress for victims in the federal
courts. These have included adoption of the federal Violence
Against Women Act ("VAWA"), which created a federal civil
rights remedy for victims of domestic violence, and adoption by
numerous states of mandatory arrest statutes, designed to elimi-
nate police discretion in refusing to enforce domestic violence
criminal laws.8 ' Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has been
hostile to attempts to create federal civil rights and constitu-
tional remedies for victims of domestic violence. 2
In United States v. Morrison, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down section 13981 of VAWA that created a federal civil remedy
for victims of gender-motivated violence.8 3 The U.S. Congress
adopted VAWA to prevent and redress violence against women.8 4
Section 13981 of VAWA radically redefined violence against wo-
men as a civil rights issue.8 5 Section 13981 provided that "per-
sons within the United States shall have the right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender."8 6 To enforce that
right, VAWA provided a civil right of action against persons who
commit "a crime of violence motivated by gender" for compensa-
tory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief8 7
The statute defined a crime motivated by gender as "a crime of
violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender,
and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gen-
der."88
In adopting VAWA, Congress relied on a substantial record
of factual findings that gender-motivated violence affected inter-
state commerce, limiting and interfering with women's employ-
ment opportunities, impoverishing women, and causing signifi-
cant state expenditures for health care and other costs that af-
80. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2006).
81. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. 748.
82. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (a).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 13981(b).
86. Id. § 13981(c).
87. Id. § 13981 (d)(1).
88. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993).
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fect the United States economy. For example, Congress found
that three out of four American women will be victims of violent
crimes sometime during their life;"9 "as many as 50 percent of
homeless women and children are fleeing domestic violence";90
between 2000 and 4000 women die yearly from domestic
abuse;9' and that, according to partial estimates, violent crime
against women costs the United States at least three billion dol-
lars per year.92 Congress also found that states had discrimi-
nated against women in their treatment of gender-based crime,
perpetuating discriminatory stereotypes that often result in in-
sufficient investigation, prosecution, and punishment of gender-
motivated crime.93 Attorney generals from thirty-eight states
supported the adoption of the federal civil rights remedy, con-
ceding that "the problem of violence against women is a national
one, requiring federal attention, federal leadership and federal
funds."94
Despite the voluminous fact-findings of the impact of do-
mestic violence, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal civil
rights remedy for gender-based violence in VAWA was an uncon-
stitutional exercise of Congressional power.95 The Court re-
jected the argument that Congress had the authority to create
the federal cause of action under the Commerce Clause, which
permits Congress, inter alia, to regulate activities "having a sub-
stantial relation" to, or that "substantially affect," interstate com-
merce.16 Gender-motivated crimes of violence, the Court held,
are not "economic in nature."97 The Court held that Congress
relied on an improper "method of reasoning" that purported to
regulate non-economic, violent crime because of its nationwide,
aggregated impact upon the national economy.9" The Com-
merce Clause, the Court held, requires a distinction between
89. See S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 37 (1990).
90. Id. at 36.
91. Id. at 33.
92. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000).
93. See Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 34-36 (1993).
94. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625.
95. Id. at 609.
96. Id. at 613.
97. See id. at 615.
98. Id. at 617-18.
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"what is truly national and what is truly local."99 Violence against
women, the court held, is non-economic, violent crime, tradi-
tionally a "local" concern regulated by states.
The Court also rejected the argument that VAWA's civil
remedy was a proper exercise of Congress' remedial power
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which autho-
rizes Congress to enforce through legislation the equal protec-
tion and due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.0 0 Although Congress found pervasive bias in the state
justice systems against victims of gender-motivated violence,
VAWA created a civil remedy against private actors, not the state
actors who had discriminated on the basis of gender. 1 ' The
Court held that Congress' section 5 powers do not extend to the
conduct of private actors. 102
In holding that VAWA did not regulate interstate com-
merce, the Court ignored Congressional findings documenting
the devastating impact of domestic violence upon the lives of wo-
men and the national economy. As the dissent points out, the
Court also ignored that gender-motivated violence operates in a
similar manner to racial discrimination in the 1960's. In Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States and Katzenbach v. McClung, the
Supreme Court relied upon evidence of the consequences of ra-
cial discrimination by motels and restaurants on interstate com-
merce to uphold Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
banned racial discrimination in hotels and restaurants, against
challenges under the Commerce Clause.10 3 In contrast, the
Court rejected similar evidence in Morrison-evidence which was
much more voluminous and well-documented.
Rather than engage in a contextual analysis of the statute
that took into account Congressional findings regarding the im-
99. See id. at 627.
100. See id. at 626.
101. See id.
102. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); see also Kat-
zenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
103. See Siegel, supra note 77, at 2206 (noting that federalism claims about VAWA's
civil rights remedy are persuasive in significant part because they perpetuate traditional
discourses of marital status in new idiomatic form. But one need not trace the lineage
of these federalism claims to appreciate how the controversy over regulation of "gen-
der-motivated violence" that we are examining will function to modernize discourses of
gender status).
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pact on women's civil rights,10 4 the Court substituted a formalis-
tic analysis that framed the legal issue as whether the legislation
regulated the "truly local" versus the "truly national" and eco-
nomic versus non-economic activity. Ignoring the discrimina-
tory impact of gender-motivated violence on women, the Court
recharacterized "gender-motivated violence against women" as
"violent crime," which it then categorized as a "local" concern
unworthy of constitutional protection. Seen through the lens of
what Catherine MacKinnon describes as "categorical formal-
ism, '" °0 VAWA becomes a statute about crime, not a statute cre-
ating a civil rights remedy to punish and deter the discrimina-
tory effects of gender violence.1"6 Treating domestic violence as
a "crime," as Elizabeth M. Schneider has argued, denies its
gendered nature by ignoring the social context in which it oc-
curs and its impact on women's liberty, autonomy, and enjoy-
ment of full citizenship.
10 7
While Morrison can be read as a part of the Rehnquist
Court's efforts to limit the power of the federal government to
legislate matters concerning the states, it also rests on the pub-
lic/private distinction that historically has underpinned the
state's refusal to enforce criminal laws against perpetrators of vi-
olence within the family.'0° In categorizing domestic violence as
a local concern, the majority ignores the myriad of federal laws
that regulate the family, including federal tax law, pension law,
property, divorce, and child custody.10 9 By ignoring the crucial
role that federal law plays in constructing women's status and
rights within the family, Morrison reinvokes the public/private
distinction that the Declaration for the Elimination of Violence
and CEDAW have condemned.
In Castle Rock, the Supreme Court in 2005 rejected another
104. Catherine MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morri-
son, 114 HARV. L. REv. 135, 173-74 (2000) (referring to the majority's analysis of VAWA
as employing "categorical formalism").
105. See generally Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights
Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of
Federalism, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 109 (2000).
106. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN: FEMINIST LAW-MAKING 230
(2000).
107. See id. at 124.
108. See Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Fed-
eral Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1741 (1991).
109. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
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attempt to constitutionalize the right to protection from domes-
tic violence. The Court held that a Colorado mandatory arrest
statute did not give a woman a constitutionally protected prop-
erty interest under the Due Process Clause in the enforcement
of a restraining order against her physically abusive husband. t10
The petitioner had obtained a restraining order against her es-
tranged husband, who violated the order and took the couple's
three children from the family home around 5:00 p.m."' Peti-
tioner repeatedly called the police, begging them to enforce the
restraining order and arrest her husband, but the police said
there was nothing they could do." 2 At around 3:20 a.m., the
husband arrived at the police station with a semi-automatic
handgun and opened fire. The police shot back at him, killing
him. The police found the murdered bodies of the couple's
children in his vehicle outside."13 Petitioner sued the town for
damages, claiming that Colorado's mandatory arrest statute cre-
ated a property interest which the state could not arbitrarily
deny under the Due Process Clause.114
The statute at issue was adopted by the Colorado state legis-
lature for the purpose of eliminating police discretion in en-
forcement of restraining orders. 1 5 It stated that "[a] peace of-
ficer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a protection
order."" 6 It directed that "[a] peace officer shall arrest, or, if an
arrest would be impractical under the circumstances, seek a war-
rant for the arrest of a restrained person when the peace officer
has information amounting to probable cause" that s/he has vio-
lated the order."17
The issue of whether the Colorado statute gave the plaintiff
an entitlement to enforcement of the restraining order which
enjoyed procedural due process protection, the Court notes, was
110. Id. at 751.
111. Id. at 753.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 754 (complaining that the "town's actions 'were taken either will-
fully, recklessly or with such gross negligence as to indicate wanton disregard and delib-
erate indifference to' respondent's civil rights.").
114. See id. at 758-59.
115. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3) (a) (West 2006).
116. Id. §§ 18-6-803.5(3)(b)-(b)(I).
117. See Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 755.
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left open in DeShaney.118 The Court held it did not.'19 As a mat-
ter of procedural due process, a benefit is not a protected enti-
tlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their dis-
cretion. 120 The majority held that the Colorado statute did not
create a truly mandatory duty to enforce the restraining order. 121
Despite the use of the word "shall" in the statute, the majority
held that this seemingly mandatory language did not override a
"well-established tradition of police discretion" in enforcing
criminal statutes, even those that seemed mandatory.1 22 Given
this tradition of police discretion, the Colorado legislature had
not adequately indicated that it intended its statute to be a true
mandate of police action, despite having used the word "shall" in
the statute. 1 23 Moreover, the statute mandated either arrest or
seeking an arrest warrant and, therefore, did not mandate a par-
ticular course of action. 124 Even assuming that the duty was
mandatory, the majority held that would not necessarily mean
that the law conferred a personal entitlement to enforcement of
the statute. 25
Further, the majority held that "it is by no means clear that
an individual entitlement to enforcement of a restraining order
could constitute a 'property' interest for purposes of the Due
Process Clause." 126 Under Board of Regents of St. Colleges v. Roth,
the property interests subject to protection under the due pro-
cess clause "extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate,
chattels, or money" and include state-conferred benefits and ser-
vices, including welfare benefits, public education, and drivers'
licenses. 1 27 The right to enforcement of a restraining order,
however, does not have "some ascertainable monetary value,"
which the majority held is implicitly required by Roth. 128 Fur-
ther, the alleged property interest arises incidentally from "a
118. See id. at 755-56. The Court concludes that the state of Colorado did not
create this entitlement.
119. See id. at 762-65.
120. See id. at 759-61.
121. Id. at 760.
122. See id. at 758-63.
123. See id. at 762-66.
124. Id. at 765-66.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 789-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 791.
128. Id. at 767 (majority opinion).
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function that government actors have always performed," i.e. "ar-
resting people whom police have probable cause to believe have
committed a criminal offense. 129
Given its holdings in DeShaney and Castle Rock, the majority
concluded that "the benefit that a third party may receive from
having someone else arrested for a crime" does not "trigger pro-
tection" under either substantive or procedural due process.13 0
These decisions, the majority explained, reflect its reluctance to
treat the Fourteenth Amendment as a "font of tort law" that
would impose liability upon state and municipal actors.'
The Court's analysis of the criminal statute in Castle Rock
ignores the long history of police inaction that has resulted in
the adoption of mandatory arrest statutes in numerous states
specifically to eliminate police discretion in this area. In a dis-
sentjoined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stevens wrote
that the Court gives "short shrift to the unique case of
'mandatory arrest' statutes in the domestic violence context"
adopted by states with the "unmistakable goal of eliminating po-
lice discretion in this area."' 13 2 The dissent locates the Colorado
statute within the context of a nationwide movement of states
that sought to redress "the crisis of police underenforcement" in
the domestic violence sphere by adopting mandatory arrest stat-
utes to eliminate police discretion. 33 Other state courts have
interpreted these mandatory arrest statutes to "eliminate the po-
lice's traditional discretion to refuse enforcement of criminal
statutes."'1 34 In concluding that Gonzales had a legitimate claim
of entitlement to enforcement created by state law, the dissent
concluded that Colorado intended to eliminate police discretion
and, the dissent concluded, the text "perfectly captures" this pur-
pose by using the word "shall. 1 35 While the precise means of
enforcement may have been to arrest or to seek an arrest war-
rant, the dissent noted that the police "lacked the discretion to
simply do nothing." '136
129. Id. at 768.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 779-81.
133. Id. at 782.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 784-85.
136. Id. at 787-88.
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Moreover, the statute conferred a direct benefit of enforce-
ment on a specific group of persons, i.e. recipients of domestic
restraining orders, defined as "protected person [s]" in section
18-6-803.5(1.5) (a).137 As the dissent observed, Roth recognized
that a purpose of the institution of property is to protect the
interests of persons in claims upon which they rely in their daily
lives.' 38 Police enforcement of protective orders, the dissent
stated, provides a valuable benefit similar to that provided by a
private security company that should constitute a protected
property interest. 139 Police enforcement of a restraining order is
a government service "no less concrete and no less valuable than
other government services, such as education."14 °
In its analysis, the majority in Castle Rock again replaced a
contextualized analysis of the failure of police to enforce re-
straining orders with a formalistic analysis that ignored the
gendered nature and impact of domestic violence. The Court
discounts the value of mandatory enforcement of restraining or-
ders to women, ignoring that police protection from domestic
violence is critical to insuring the safety of the lives of millions of
women in this nation. Surely the right to be free of violence is as
important to women's lives as the right to drive a car. In charac-
terizing Ms. Gonzalez' claim as that of a "third party" seeking an
arrest of another person, the majority erases the gendered na-
ture of domestic violence which not only physically harms wo-
men, but denies them equal access to employment, housing,
travel, and the right to life itself. By characterizing the failure of
police to enforce a protective order as a "tort," the Court locates
the nature of the wrong as the idiosyncratic negligence or mal-
feasance of individual police officers rather than the systemic re-
fusal of the state to punish domestic violence as a crime. Each of
the classificatory steps reinvokes the public/private distinction as
a rationalization for disclaiming state responsibility for guaran-
teeing the fundamental right to life and liberty to its female citi-
zens.
In Morrison and Castle Rock, the U.S. Supreme Court
thwarted the use of the federal Constitution to redress systematic
137. Id. at 789-92.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See SCHNEIDER, BATrERED WOMEN: FEMINIST LAWMAKING, supra note 106, at
210-31.
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gender-based discrimination against women by the State. In
both cases, the Court rejected a contextualized understanding of
the enormous effects of domestic violence upon millions of wo-
men's lives in favor of a formalistic analysis that reinvokes the
public/private dichotomy. Rather than conceptualize domestic
violence as impairing women's equality or civil rights, the Su-
preme Court has categorized domestic violence in gender-neu-
tral terms, i.e. as a "violent crime" that implicates "local" con-
cerns that do not justify federal constitutional protection. This
categorization implicitly rests upon the public/private dichot-
omy rejected by the Declaration for the Elimination of Violence
Against Women and CEDAW.
The Court's conceptualization of violence as a private, fam-
ily matter limits and shapes the legal strategies to redress domes-
tic violence. Advocates have successfully lobbied for criminal law
reforms to compel the state to punish domestic violence, such as
broaden the definitions of intimate violence, enhancing crimi-
nal penalties, and adopting mandatory arrest and no-drop poli-
cies.' While the criminalization of domestic violence sends the
critical message that private violence is a public issue, it focuses
on the criminal culpability of individuals rather than on the
structural inequalities that reinforce and perpetuate gender-
based violence. Domestic violence becomes a problem of "crime
control," as Elizabeth Schneider argues, rather than a problem
of gender inequality or subordination of women. 4 2 Criminaliz-
ing domestic violence ironically risks reinforcing the traditional
judicial notion that it is a "local" matter subject to state regula-
tion rather than a civil rights issue that implicates federal consti-
tutional rights.
III. SOUTH AFRICA: STATE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
REQUIRED TO PREVENT AND ELIMINATE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
The South African Constitutional Court, in contrast to the
United States Supreme Court, recognizes that domestic violence
is a means of gender subordination which the state has an af-
firmative obligation to eradicate. The difference in approach
reflects substantive differences in the nature and scope of the
141. Id. at 230.
142. Id. at 790.
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two constitutions, as well as in the willingness of the Constitu-
tional Court to understand domestic violence as gender subordi-
nation with concrete effects upon women's civil liberties.
The South African Constitution differs substantially from
that of the United States, explicitly guaranteeing the right to
gender equality as a foundational constitutional norm, recogniz-
ing that equality has not yet been achieved, and authorizing
measures to protect and advance persons disadvantaged by un-
fair discrimination. 143 In contrast to the United States, whose
Constitution was drafted by men, women activists in South Africa
played a fundamental role in insuring a constitutional and politi-
cal commitment to gender equality in post-apartheid South Af-
rica. 144 Because the struggle for women's equality occurred
within the context of the struggle for national liberation, South
African women activists effectively mobilized the political and or-
ganizational skills acquired during the struggle for racial equality
to compel the inclusion of women's issues in the Constitution.1 45
While the struggle against racial apartheid took precedence over
issues of gender equality, women in the African National Con-
gress ("ANC") began to press for the inclusion of gender equal-
ity as part of the national liberation struggle and the transition
to post-apartheid South Africa. 146
In 1991, the ANC Women's League organized a meeting of
about forty women's organizations with the goal of developing a
Charter of Women's Rights to identify the needs of women and
include their concerns in the constitution. The league subse-
quently formed the Women's National Coalition ("WNC"), a
broad coalition of over 105 national and regional women's orga-
nizations, to coordinate a national political campaign to mobil-
ize and educate women and entrench equality for women in the
143. SeeJustice Zak Yacoob, Some Perspectives on the Movement Towards and the Strug-
gle for Equality in Our Context, in EQUALITY LAW: REFLECTIONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND
ELSEWHERE 1-2 (F. du Bois, A. Fagan, S. Jagwanth, R. Jooste, E. Kalula, K. Lehmann &
D.P. Visser eds. 1994).
144. See Penelope E. Andrews, Violence Against Women in South Africa: The Role of
Culture and the Limitations of the Law, 8 TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REv. 425, 440-41
(1999); see also Catherine Albertyn, Women and the Transition to Democracy in South Africa,
in GENDER AND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 47-63 (Christina Murray ed.
1994).
145. See Andrews, supra note 144, at 441-42; see also Felicity Kaganas and Christina
Murray, Law and Women's Rights in South Africa: An Overview, in GENDER AND THE NEW
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 1 (Christina Murray ed., 1994).
146. See Albertyn, supra note 144, at 48.
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new Constitution.147
During the transition to democracy, the WNC and women
activists succeeded in developing a consensus concerning wo-
men's subordination in South African society and in securing a
political commitment to the role of the state in eliminating gen-
der inequality."4  As Catherine Albertyn explains, the WNC
"sought to construct an understanding of equality that took ac-
count of the social, economic and cultural reality of women's
lives.' 49 The women's movement in South Africa was supported
by international feminist groups, activists, and scholars engaged
in similar struggles. 15' During the negotiations over the new
constitution between the major South African political parties,
the WNC lobbied the participants to include the right to gender
equality in the new Constitution.1 51 They also successfully per-
suaded the ANC to name female candidates to one-third of its
electoral lists of parliamentary candidates in the 1994 election,
ensuring substantial representation by women in parliament. 152
As a result of their efforts, they succeeded in securing both a
constitutional and political commitment to gender equality and
non-sexism. Section 9 of the South African Constitution ex-
pressly guarantees the right to equality on the basis of gender. 5
147. See id. at 50-51.
148. See Gay W. Seidman, Gendered Citizenship: South Africa's Democratic Transition
and the Construction of a Gendered State, 13 GENDER & Soc'y 287, 302 (1999).
149. Albertyn, supra note 135, at 52.
150. See Andrews, supra note 144, at 427-28.
151. See Albertyn, supra note 144, at 57-60.
152. See Andrews, supra note 144, at 440-41.
153. S. AiR. CONST. 1996 s. 9. Section 9 of the Bill of Rights provides:
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and
benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.
To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures
designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disad-
vantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against any-
one on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disa-
bility, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone
on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation
must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is
unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.
Id. s. 9.
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The Constitution also specifically guarantees the right to dig-
nity,154 the right to bodily and psychological integrity, 155 and the
right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading way. 156 Unlike the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees
merely negative liberties, Section 7 of the Constitution obliges
the state to respect, promote, and fulfill the Bill of Rights.1 57
Thus, the South African Constitution affirmatively obligates the
state to take steps to realize the rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution.
The right to equality under the South African Constitution
is much broader in scope than the right to equal protection in
the U.S. Constitution. Section 9(3) provides that the state "may
not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly" on several enu-
merated grounds, including sex and gender.15 While the U.S.
Supreme Court has interpreted the right of equal protection to
prohibit only intentional discrimination, the Constitutional
Court has held that "conduct which may appear to be neutral
and non-discriminatory may nonetheless result in discrimina-
tion.' 1 59 Consequently, lack of specific evidence of intent is not
dispositive.' 60 While the Supreme Court has interpreted the
right to equal protection to apply only to state action, Article
9(4) expressly prohibits any "person" from unfairly discriminat-
ing on one or more of the enumerated grounds. 161
Unlike the right to equal protection under the U.S. Consti-
tution, the right to equality under the South African Constitu-
tion embraces substantive rather than formal equality. As Saras
Jagwanth explains, in interpreting Section 9, the Constitutional
Court "has stressed that a rigid, formal approach must be re-
jected in favour of a substantive, contextual and asymmetrical
analysis" that interprets the right to equality in light of past and
154. See id. s. 10.
155. See id. s. 12(2).
156. See id. s. 12(1)(e).
157. See id. s. 7(2).
158. See id. s. 9(3). Other grounds include, inter alia, sexual orientation, religion,
disability, age, and social belief.
159. City Council ofPretoria v. Walker 1998 (3) BCLR I (CC) at 52 (S. Mr.).
160. See id. The Court noted, however, that absence of an intent to discriminate
may be relevant in determining the unfairness of discrimination. See id. 39.
161. See S. Ai'. CoNsT. 1996 s. 9(4); see also Saras Jagwanth, Affirmative Action in a
Transformative Context: The South African Experience, 36 CONN. L. Rv. 725, 726 (2004).
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continuing discrimination. 16 2 The Constitutional Court recog-
nizes that certain groups in South Africa suffered "considerable
unfair discrimination" in the past which must be taken into ac-
count.1 6 Courts must carefully examine the impact of the dis-
criminatory action upon the particular people concerned "to de-
termine whether its overall impact is one which furthers the con-
stitutional goal of equality or not. A classification which is unfair
in one context may not necessarily be unfair in a different con-
text."1 64 Section 9(2) specifically authorizes the government to
adopt affirmative action legislation and programs to "protect or
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by un-
fair discrimination" to "promote the achievement of equality."'65
In addition to embodying a commitment to substantive gen-
der equality, the South African Constitution guarantees individu-
als a broad range of socioeconomic rights, including the right to
health and housing.'6 6 The state must take reasonable measures
to assure the progressive realization of these rights. 67 In a series
of decisions, the Constitutional Court has acknowledged that
these socioeconomic rights are justiciable. 6 Significantly, the
162. Id. at 727.
163. Nat'l Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (1)
BCLR 39, (CC) at 35 (S. Mr.).
164. President of S. Aft. v. Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708, (CC) at 74 (S. Mr.), available at
1997 SACLR LEXIS 91, at *68-*69. In determining whether a challenged policy violates
the right to equality, the court must first determine whether the provision differentiates
between people or groups. If so, the court will first determine whether the policy
bear[s] a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose[.]" Harkson v. Lane,
1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) at PP 42-53, available at 1997 SACLR LEXIS 20, at *53-*68.
If it does not, Section 9(1) has been violated. If the challenged policy does bear a ra-
tional connection, the court will proceed to consider whether the policy is discrimina-
tory. Id. at *67. If the policy discriminates on one of the enumerated grounds, it is
presumed to constitute unfair discrimination. Id. If the policy is "objectively" based on
a ground which has "the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons
as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner," the court
will consider whether the discrimination is unfair. Id. In determining whether the dis-
crimination is unfair, courts must consider various factors, including the position of the
complainants in society and whether they have suffered from past patterns of discrimi-
nation, the nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by
it, and any other relevant factors.
165. S. AnR. CONST. 1996 s. 9(2).
166. Id. s. 26(1); 27.
167. Id. s. 26(2); 27.
168. See, e.g., Gov't of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom & Others 2000 (11)
BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Mr.).
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Constitution explicitly provides that the rights contained therein
are inter-related.
In addition to its commitment to substantive equality and
socioeconomic rights, the South African Constitution explicitly
recognizes the injustices of its past. In its preamble, the Consti-
tution explicitly identifies as a foundational goal "heal [ing] the
divisions of the past and establish [ing] a society based on demo-
cratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights" in
which "every citizen is equally protected by law."169
Applying these constitutional provisions, the Constitutional
Court has held repeatedly that the Constitution provides women
with the right to be free of domestic violence and the state has
an affirmative obligation to prevent and eliminate such violence.
The Court has explicitly adopted a nuanced and contextual anal-
ysis of domestic violence that recognizes that it is a form of gen-
der subordination that impedes women's equality, liberty, and
other fundamental liberties. In addition, the Court has also con-
sidered the inter-relationship between the right to equality and
other rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, such as the right to
security of the person and the right to dignity. By engaging in a
nuanced analysis of the concrete effects of gender-based vio-
lence on women in South Africa, the Court has given substance
to the right to equality.
In Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Security & Another,70 the
Constitutional Court expressly held that the South African Con-
stitution imposed positive duties upon the state to take preven-
tive measures to protect individuals whose lives are at risk from
the criminal acts of others. In Carmichele, the female appellant
had been viciously attacked by Francois Coetzee, who was free
on bail pending trial on charges of raping a woman. 171 The po-
lice and prosecutor had recommended that Coetzee be released
without bail and failed to inform the court regarding a prior
conviction.' 7 2 The applicant sued the Minister for Safety and Se-
curity and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Develop-
ment for damages, claiming that the police and prosecutors had
negligently failed to prevent Coetzee from harming her.173 The
169. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, pmbl.
170. 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC) (S. Mr.).
171. See id. 11 12, 21.
172. See id. 13.
173. See id. 25.
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applicant claimed that the police and prosecutors owed her a
duty to ensure her constitutional rights to life, dignity, freedom
and security, privacy and freedom of movement. 174 Further, she
argued that the Constitution imposed a particular duty on the
State to protect women against violence, crime and sexual
abuse. 75
Explicitly rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's approach in
DeShaney, the Constitutional Court held that the State's obliga-
tion to protect the right to life was not limited to adopting crimi-
nal laws to deter the commission of crime. 176 The Court held
that the South African Constitution entrenches the right to life,
dignity, and freedom and security of the person.1 77 The Consti-
tution does not merely prohibit the state from interfering with
these rights but imposes certain positive duties upon the State
and all of its organs to promote and protect these rights. 178 In
particular situations, the Constitutional Court held the State has
a positive obligation to take preventive measures to protect an
individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of an-
other.1 79
Although the common law did not recognize such a duty on
the part of the State, the Constitutional Court held that the Bill
of Rights applies to the common law and that section 173 of the
Constitution gives all higher courts the power to develop the
common law taking into account the interest of justice. 80 Sec-
tion 39(2) provides that, when developing the common law,
every court must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the
Bill of Rights. The Constitutional Court's analysis, therefore, was
informed by its understanding that the South African Constitu-
tion is transformational in nature.1 81 Whether the police had a
legal duty to act must be decided "in the context of a constitu-
tional state founded on dignity, equality and freedom and in
174. See id. 27.
175. See id. 29.
176. See id. 45.
177. See id. 43.
178. See id. 44.
179. See id. 45.
180. See S. ArR. CONST. 1996 s. 173.
181. See ChristopherJ. Roederer, The Constitutionally Inspired Approaches to Police Ac-
countability for Violence Against Women in the U.S. and South Africa: Conservation Versus
Transformation, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 91 (2005); see also Karl E. Klare, Legal
Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AiR. J. HUM. RTS. 146 (1998).
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which government has positive duties to promote and uphold
such values."' 8 2
In contrast to the categorical formalism employed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Morrison and Castle Rock, the South Afri-
can Constitutional Court's analysis in Carmichele focused on the
gendered nature of sexual violence and its impact upon wo-
men's freedom and equality. The Court held that "few things
can be more important to women than freedom from the threat
of sexual violence."' 83 Sexual violence "goes to the core of wo-
men's subordination in society" and is "the single greatest threat
to the self-determination of South African women. '8 4 As a state
agency, the police are responsible to protect the public in gen-
eral and women and children in particular from violent crime.'85
The Court also held that South Africa had a duty under interna-
tional law to prohibit gender-based discrimination that impairs
women's enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms and to
take steps to prevent the violation of those rights." 6 Applying
these principles, the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the High Court on remand that the police and
prosecutors owed the applicant a legal duty to protect her
against the risk of sexual violence by Coetzee.18 7
Further, in State v Baloyi, the Constitutional Court upheld
the Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993 ("the 1993
Act").' 8 The appellant, Godfrey Baloyi, challenged the Act after
his wife obtained an interdict pursuant to the Act enjoining
Baloyi from assaulting his wife and their child, as well as a war-
rant for his arrest, which was suspended pursuant to the terms of
the Act. 189 Subsequently, the appellant allegedly assaulted the
complainant and threatened to kill her; he was convicted by a
magistrate for violation of the interdict.'9 Baloyi argued that
the Act unconstitutionally infringed on his right to be presumed
182. Carmichele, (10) BCLR 995 (CC) 43.
183. Id. 1 62.
184. See id.
185. See id. 1 62.
186. See id.
187. See generally id.
188. State v. Baloyi (Minister of Justice & Another Intervening) 2000 (2) SA 425
(CC) (S. Mr.). At the time of the decision, the Act was about to be replaced by the
Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998.
189. See id. 3.
190. See id.
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innocent and have his guilt proved beyond reasonable doubt.191
The Constitutional Court held that the 1993 Act, properly
construed, does not impose a reverse onus on the accused to
prove his innocence. 19 2 As in Carmichele, the Constitutional
Court in Baloyi held that the State has a constitutional obligation
to deal effectively with domestic violence. 19 3 While recognizing
that all crime harms society, the Constitutional Court distin-
guished domestic violence, focusing on "its hidden, repetitive
character and its immeasurable ripple effects on our society and,
in particular, on family life." '94 Domestic violence "cuts across
class, race, culture and geography, and is all the more pernicious
because it is so often concealed and so frequently goes unpun-
ished."19 5 The Court noted the devastating social and economic
costs of domestic violence to the victims and the nation's com-
munities.
1 9 6
The Court held that the South African Constitution obli-
gated the State to take affirmative action to prevent and elimi-
nate domestic violence. Section 12(1) provides that "[e]veryone
has the right to freedom and security of the person, which in-
cludes the right to be free from all forms of violence from either
public or private sources." 197 Section 7(2) of the Constitution
provides that "[t] he state must respect, protect, promote and ful-
fill the rights in the Bill of Rights."' 98 The Court held that, read
together, these sections obligate the State to "protect the right of
everyone to be free from private or domestic violence."' 9 In ad-
dition, the Constitution obligates the State to protect the right to
bodily and psychological integrity, the right to dignity, the right
to not be subjected to torture in any way, and the right to not be
treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman, or degrading way.2 °°
The Court also held that international law obligated the govern-
ment to seek to remedy the injustice of domestic violence, in-
cluding the breaches of violations of the Universal Declaration
191. See id. 18.
192. See id. 25.
193. See id. 29.
194. Id. I 11.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.; see also S. AiR. CONST. 1996 s. 12(1)
198. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s. 7(2).
199. Baloyi, 2000 (2) SA 425 (CC) 11.
200. See id.
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of Human Rights, the Declaration on the Elimination of Vio-
lence against Women, CEDAW, and the African Charter on
Human and People's Rights. 2 °1
While the U.S. Supreme Court has ignored the gendered
dimension of domestic violence, the Constitutional Court in
Baloyi held that domestic violence implicates the constitutional
right to gender equality.20 2 Justice Sachs explained that domes-
tic violence is "systemic, pervasive and overwhelmingly gender-
specific. '20 3 As such, it "reflects and reinforces patriarchal domi-
nation, and does so in a particularly brutal form."2 4 The Court
recognized that notions of patriarchy, autonomy, and privacy
have been used to justify non-interference by the state into what
is perceived as a private or intimate matter.205 The Court specifi-
cally recognized that the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice
system in addressing family violence:
[I]ntensifies the subordination and helplessness of the vic-
ims. This also sends an unmistakable message to the whole of
society that the daily trauma of vast numbers of women
counts for little. The terrorization of the individual victims is
thus compounded by a sense that domestic violence is inevita-
ble. Patterns of systemic sexist behavior are normalized
rather than combated. 0 6
Nonenforcement violates the foundational commitment to non-
sexism and the right to gender equality under the South African
Constitution.20 7
The South African Constitutional Court reiterated these
principles in a 2005 decision upholding the Domestic Violence
Act 116 of 1998 (the "Domestic Violence Act"), the successor to
the act analyzed in Carmichele. In Omar v. The Government of the
Republic of South Africa, the Constitutional Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of Section 8 of the Domestic Violence Act, which
provides for a court to authorize a warrant of arrest when it is-
sues a protective order.2 8 The Court held that Section 8 does
201. See id. 9 13.
202. See id. 1 12.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id. 9 12.
206. Id. (citing Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106
HARv. L. REv. 1498, 1552 (1993).
207. Baloyi 2000 (2) SA (CC) 1 12.
208. See generally Omar v. South Africa 2006 (2) BCLR 253 (CC) (S. Afr).
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not violate the rights to freedom and security of the person, a
fair trial and access to the courts guaranteed by the South Afri-
can Constitution. 2°9
In its analysis, the Court considered the social context and
purpose of the Domestic Violence Act. In its preamble, the Act
recognizes that domestic violence is a serious social evil; that the
South African Constitution assures the right to equality and free-
dom of security of the person; and other international commit-
ments and obligations require the State to end violence against
women and children. 21" The stated purpose of the Act is to "af-
ford the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection
from domestic abuse that the law can provide" and to ensure
that the "state give full effect to the provisions of the Act" and "to
convey that the State is committed to the elimination of domes-
tic violence."21'
Declaring the high incidence of domestic violence as "ut-
terly unacceptable," the Constitutional Court recognized that
domestic violence causes severe psychological and social
harm.212 Significantly, the Court stated that "the gendered na-
ture and effects of violence and abuse as it mostly occurs in the
family, and the unequal power relations implicitly therein, are
obvious. 2 1 3 Citing Baloyi, the Court in Omar reiterated that do-
mestic violence reflects and reinforces patriarchal domination
and that the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system in ad-
dressing such violence exacerbates the subordination of the vic-
tim and normalizes sexist behavior.214
The Court concluded that domestic violence "brutally of-
fends the values and rights enshrined in the Constitution," in-
cluding non-sexism, human dignity, equality and the advance-
ment of human rights and freedoms. 215 In addition, domestic
violence offends various rights guaranteed in the Constitution:
the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes
the right to be free from all violence whether public or private;
209. See id.
210. See id. 11.
211. Id.
212. Id. 13.
213. Id.
214. See id. 16.
215. See id. 17.
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the right to dignity; life; equality; and privacy. 216 Again citing
Baloyi, the Court held that the South African Constitution obli-
gates the State "to deal effectively with domestic violence. ' 17 In-
ternational law also obligates South Africa to prohibit gender-
based discrimination and to take reasonable measures to prevent
the violation of women's fundamental rights and freedoms.
218
The Court recognized that the Act addresses "[t]he historical
ambivalence of the role of law enforcement" by requiring the
police to take specific steps in addressing complaints of domestic
violence.219
The South African Constitution's commitment to non-sex-
ism and non-racism, guarantee of substantive gender equality,
and provision of justiciable socioeconomic rights similarly offers
a powerful arsenal with the potential to transform the position of
women in South African society. The Constitution itself ac-
knowledges the historical discrimination faced by South African
women and explicitly seeks to transform its society. In affirming
the States' positive duty to prevent and eliminate violence
against women, the Constitutional Court has employed a contex-
tualized analysis of domestic violence that recognizes its role in
creating and perpetuating women's historical subordination and
vulnerability to gender-based violence.
While the Court's decisions have focused on the role of the
police and criminal justice system in protecting women from vio-
lence, the Court also has held that the right to equality requires
the State to provide women with the basic socioeconomic rights
guaranteed in the Constitution. In Government of the Republic of
South Africa v. Grotboom, the Constitutional Court held that South
Africa violated its obligation to take reasonable measures to pro-
gressively recognize the right to housing guaranteed under Sec-
tion 26 of the Constitution, taking into account the limitations
of available resources. 220 Linking the achievement of equality to
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. Id. 21.
220. See Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom and Others,
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (1999). Irene Grootboom was rendered homeless after she
was evicted from a squatter settlement near Cape Town, along with 510 children and
390 other adults. The Constitutional Court held that Section 26 prohibited the state
from impairing the right of access to adequate housing and required the state to take
reasonable measures to progressively realize the right to housing, taking into account
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the attainment of basic socioeconomic rights, the Court ex-
plained that:
All the rights in our Bill of Rights are inter-related and mutu-
ally supporting. There can be no doubt that human dignity,
freedom and equality, the foundational values of our society,
are denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter. Af-
fording socio-economic rights to all people therefore enables
them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in Chapter 2 [The
Bill of Rights]. The realisation of these rights is also key to
the advancement of race and gender equality and the evolu-
tion of a society in which men and women are equally able to
achieve their full potential. 22 1
Women's rights advocates thus have a doctrinal basis to ar-
gue that the State must remedy the violations of women's socio-
economic rights in order to prevent violence against women.
For example, advocates could challenge the failure of the state
under Section 26 to provide adequate shelter or housing for wo-
men who flee domestic violence or who are ostracized from their
community after seeking legal protection from their husbands.
Without access to adequate shelter under Section 26, women are
vulnerable to continued violence, which in turn violates the right
to equality under Section 9.
The transformative potential of the legal rights afforded wo-
men in South Africa, not surprisingly, faces substantial practical
challenges. While the Constitution has tremendous potential to
alter the position of women in South African society, most wo-
men lack access to the courts, especially those living in rural ar-
eas. In 1994, 74% of police stations in South Africa were located
in white suburbs or business districts.222 This means that black
women in rural areas are faced with prohibitive travel costs that
impair their access to police protection and the court system, as
well as necessary suport services. As in many other societies, vio-
lence against women remains pervasive and deeply-engrained in
patriarchal attitudes that continue to put women' lives at risk
the limitations of available resources. In doing so, the government must pay particular
attention to those who are most vulnerable.
221. Id. 23.
222. LISA VETrON, ADDRESSING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: REFLECTIONS
ON STRATEGY AND PRACTICE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: GOOD PRACTICE IN COMBATING
AND ELIMINATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 5-6 (2005) available at http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-gp-2005/docs/experts/vetten.vaw.pdf.
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despite the criminalization of such violence under law. The con-
ceptualization of domestic violence as an issue of equality, how-
ever, is a critical step in holding the State accountable for the
eradication of both the causes and the effects of intimate vio-
lence.
CONCLUSION
More than ten years after the adoption of the Declaration
for the Elimination of Violence against Women, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has refused to recognize a constitutional right to
protection from domestic violence. In contrast, the South Afri-
can Constitutional Court has recognized that the State has af-
firmative obligations to prevent and eliminate domestic violence.
The difference does not merely result from doctrinal differ-
ences; it also reflects different conceptions of domestic violence
and gender equality. By understanding domestic violence as a
means of gender subordination, the Constitutional Court has
been able to acknowledge the role of the State in perpetuating
violence. The U.S. Supreme Court, on the other hand, charac-
terizes domestic violence as a gender-neutral crime that does not
implicate equality or other civil rights.
The difference in conceptualization of intimate violence
and its relationship to gender equality arises in part from the
different jurisprudence of the right to equality. By embracing
formal equality as the measure of the right to equal protection,
the U.S. Supreme Court has largely ignored the context in which
violence occurs and its concrete effects on women's ability to
fully enjoy the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and equal pro-
tection guaranteed by the Constitution. Instead, the Supreme
Court has chosen to conceptualize intimate violence against wo-
men in the abstract. Decisions about whether to recognize a
constitutional right to be free from private violence, for exam-
ple, turn not on a contextualized discussion of the concrete,
real-life impact of violence on women. Instead, the U.S. Su-
preme Court engages in what MacKinnon and others refer to as
"categorical formalism," a barren analytical move that denies the
gendered nature and effects of violence, ignores the history of
state condemnation of violence against women, and continues to
dichotomize the private (family) and the public (state), relegat-
ing violence against women to the private and local rather than
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invoking the power of the federal constitution to protect the very
life and liberty of women.223
By examining the changing conceptions of violence against
women in international law and the jurisprudence of the South
African Constitutional Court, the limitations of the U.S. ap-
proach become clear. To the extent that the Supreme Court has
signaled a willingness to consider international law and norms
with respect to homosexuality and cases involving the death pen-
alty,2 2 4 engaging in a comparative analysis of the jurisprudence
of violence against women hopefully will broaden the Court's
understanding of the relationship between violence against wo-
men and women's right to equality under the federal Constitu-
tion.
This is not to say that the human rights approach is the sil-
ver bullet to eradicating violence against women. In evaluating
the transformative potential of a human rights approach to do-
mestic violence, it is important to consider the practical difficul-
ties in employing the international conventions, declarations
and documents that define domestic violence as discrimination.
The 2006 report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, for example, takes a critical look at the effectiveness of
the due diligence standard in eradicating the causes of gender-
based violence. 225 The Special Rapporteur concludes that States
have focused their due diligence efforts on legislative reform,
access to justice, and the provision of services to victims. 226 The
focus has been on violence after it has occurred rather than on
efforts to prevent violence, compensate victims, and hold non-
state actors responsible for their acts. 227 In particular, the Report
concludes that States have neglected their obligation to trans-
form the patriarchal social structures and cultural values that
condone and perpetuate violence against women. 22 The chal-
lenge remains to eliminate the root causes and consequences of
domestic violence.
The transformative potential of the legal rights afforded wo-
223. See MacKinnon, Disrupting Male Sovereignty, supra note 104.
224. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
225. See generally Report of Special Rapporter, supra note 13.
226. Id. at 6.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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men in South Africa also faces substantial challenges, both social
and economic. As Penelope Andrews argues, the legacy of ra-
cism and apartheid includes a deep-rooted masculinist culture
that perpetuates women's subordinate position through vio-
lence. 229 Andrews identifies three manifestations of South Afri-
can culture that have produced a masculinist culture that con-
dones violence against women: the maintenance of apartheid
through militarization and forced conscription of white men,
who engaged in brutal tactics to repress blacks; the valorization
of black men in the townships who confronted the apartheid re-
gime and developed a culture of violence, including sexual vio-
lence against women, as part of their masculine identity; and the
role of traditional customary law in enforcing the subordination
of women. 230 The roots of violence toward women cannot be
solved by mere invocation of constitutional rights.
The transformative potential of the guarantee of socioeco-
nomic rights similarly is limited by a lack of economic resources
sufficient to eliminate the glaring inequalities and poverty faced
by the majority of South Africans.23 1 As of 2001, approximately
57% of South Africans lived below the poverty line.23 9 Between
1996 and 2001, the percentage of persons below the poverty line
did not change; the gap between the rich and the poor in fact
widened.233 With more resources, the government of South Af-
rica would be better able to provide shelter and services for vic-
tims of domestic violence as well as reduce the socioeconomic
inequalities faced by women that make them particularly vulner-
able to violence. Despite these limitations, many in South Africa
continue to believe in the power of the Constitution to inspire a
vision of a more equitable society that can make the promise of
substantive equality real.2 34
229. Andrews, supra, note 144, at 457.
230. Id. at 437-39.
231. See Heinz Klug, Five Years On: How Relevant is the Constitution to the New South
Africa, 26 VT. L. REv. 803, 803-05 (2002). Klug argues that the Constitution continues
to have relevance for the majority of South Africans, despite the admitted lack of re-
sources available to the government to redress the vast socioeconomic inequalities that
continue to pervade the society.
232. See CRAIG ScHWABE, HuMAN SCIENCES RES. COUNCIL, FACT SHEET: POVERTY IN
SOUTH AIuCA, July 26, 2004, available at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d00009
90/P1096-FactSheetNo. 1-Poverty.pdf.
233. Id.
234. Klug, supra note 231.
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The shift toward a human rights approach to intimate vio-
lence offers a contextualized understanding of the relationship
between intimate violence and gender subordination. Recogniz-
ing the pervasiveness of violence against women and the devas-
tating consequences on women's daily lives is a critical first step
in devising strategies to empower women and liberate their full
potential as equal citizens.
